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a b s t r a c t
Harvest control rules (HCRs) have been implemented for many ﬁsheries worldwide. However, in most
instances, those HCRs are not based on the explicit feedbacks between stock properties and economic
considerations. This paper develops a bio-economic model that evaluates the HCR adopted in 2004 by
the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fishery Commission to manage the world’s largest cod stock, Northeast
Arctic cod (NEA). The model considered here is biologically and economically detailed, and is the ﬁrst to
compare the performance of the stock’s current HCR with that of alternative HCRs derived with
optimality criteria. In particular, HCRs are optimized for economic objectives including ﬂeet proﬁts,
economic welfare, and total yield and the emerging properties are analyzed. The performance of these
optimal HCRs was compared with the currently used HCR. This paper show that the current HCR does
in fact comes very close to maximizing proﬁts. Furthermore, the results reveal that the HCR that
maximizes proﬁts is the most precautionary one among the considered HCRs. Finally, the HCR that
maximizes yield leads to un-precautionary low levels of biomass. In these ways, the implementation of
the HCR for NEA cod can be viewed as a success story that may provide valuable lessons for other
ﬁsheries.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
1.1. Northeast Arctic cod and its current management plan
Northeast Arctic (NEA) cod (Gadus morhua) is currently the
world’s largest cod stock, distributed from its feeding grounds in
the Barents Sea to its spawning grounds off the Lofoten islands in
the Norwegian Sea [1]. The ﬁshery consists of two parts that are
geographically separate: the feeding-ground ﬁshery in the north
and the spawning-ground ﬁshery further south (Fig. 1). Humans
have been ﬁshing on the spawning grounds for more than a
thousand years, beginning with the export of cod during the
Viking Age [2]. Until the 1930s, the spawning-ground ﬁshery
dominated catches, due to its proximity to coastal villages and
ports. However, during the 1930s the advent of industrial ﬁshing
technology facilitated the expansion of the NEA cod ﬁshery into
the Barents Sea. This expansion led to a shift of catches toward
the stock’s feeding grounds, as well as to an increase in the total
ﬁshing mortality (Fig. 2a). In 2010, ICES (the International Council
for Exploration of the Sea) estimated the spawning-stock biomass
(SSB) of NEA cod to reach 1,145,000 t, the highest amount that has
been observed since 1947 [3]. The stock’s total biomass has also
increased, even though not concomitantly with the SSB (Fig. 2b).
In addition to possible climate effects, this recent increase in SSB
could have at least two explanations: First, illegal ﬁshing has been
reduced from the maximum of 166,000 t in 2005 to approxi-
mately zero in 2009 [4]. This decline is most likely due to the
introduction of port control in 2007, requiring all vessels to
document that their landings are legally caught. Second, a joint
Norwegian–Russian harvest control rule (HCR) that determines
the total allowable catch (TAC) has been implemented since 2004,
to ensure that the stock is not at ‘‘risk of being harvested
unsustainably’’ or ‘‘suffering reduced reproductive capacity’’ [5,6].
NEA cod is an economically very important ﬁsh resource [7,8]
mostly situated in the exclusive economic zones of Norway and
Russia (Fig. 1). For years, NEA cod has been managed jointly by
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those two countries, though not without scientiﬁc and political
disagreements [9]. To enable more farsighted management and to
simplify the annual negotiations on harvest levels, an HCR was
agreed upon by the two countries in 2004 (Fig. 2c). In general, an
HCR is an algorithm and a tactical management tool that
translates biological information, such as a stock’s current SSB,
into management information such as a TAC for that stock during
the next ﬁshing season. An HCR is often designed with the help of
reference points for target biomass and ﬁshing mortality. In
particular, the precautionary reference points for biomass and
ﬁshing mortality, Bpa and Fpa, respectively, act as buffers to
account for natural variability and uncertainty in the stock
assessment: Bpa implements a ‘‘safety margin’’ to reduce the risk
that the true SSB falls below a limit reference point Blim below
which the stock is expected to suffer from reduced reproductive
capacity. Likewise, Fpa is meant to avoid a true ﬁshing mortality
that exceeds the limit reference point Flim above which SSB is
expected to drop below Blim [5]. The range of these buffers
depends on the level of uncertainty and on the level of risk
ﬁsheries managers are willing to accept on behalf of society.
In autumn 2004, the 33rd session of the Joint Norwegian–
Russian Fishery Commission adopted a HCR stipulating that the
ﬁshing mortality is allowed to be at Fpa as long as SSB exceeds Bpa,
but is required linearly to decrease from Fpa to 0 as SSB decreases
from Bpa to 0 (Fig. 2c). Therefore, ﬁshing can take place at all SSB
levels [10]. The HCR contains additional elements that aim to
restrict how much the TAC can change from one year to the next.
However, the TAC advised by the adopted HCR is not always
followed. For example in 2009, due to the high SSB, the TAC was
decided by the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fishery Commission to be
525,000 tonnes, while the adopted HCR advised 473,000 tonnes
[11]. Today, the NEA stock is classiﬁed as having ‘‘full reproductive
capacity’’ and being ‘‘harvested sustainably’’ [6,12].
1.2. Need for adaptive management and clear objectives
Despite considerable attention to the management of marine
ecosystems, most ﬁsheries have yet to be optimized to reach
management goals [13–16]. Political obstacles and roadblocks
play an important role in failures of ﬁsheries management [17].
Also, some scientiﬁc models for optimal management are not
easily applicable to real-world situations, and may be based on
hidden and/or overly simple assumptions [18].
Another obstacle for successful ﬁsheries management is the
fact that it is often not explicit, or evident a priori, which
particular objectives should be pursued [16,19,20]. At a very basic
level, a speciﬁc ﬁsh stock can provide income to society, but also
serves as an important food source. Therefore, one may favour a
harvesting rate that provides the highest perpetual yield, known
as the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), and this objective has
been endorsed in various international agreements [19]. Eco-
nomic science has added an important reﬁnement to the purely
biological consideration of MSY by accounting for the costs and
beneﬁts associated with resource extraction [21,22]. This allows
deriving an exploitation path that maximizes proﬁts from har-
vesting, but is based on the simplifying assumption that the
government, at least theoretically, is the ‘‘sole owner’’ of the
resource. The contrast between these two basic approaches
already shows that a crucial prerequisite for achieving optimal
exploitation is the clear speciﬁcation of management goals.
Fig. 1. Distribution of NEA cod, with feeding grounds in the Barents Sea and
spawning grounds along the Norwegian coast. The ﬁgure has been developed by
the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research.
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Fig. 2. (a) Historic ﬁshing mortality rates in the feeding grounds (black line) and spawning grounds (grey line) for 1932–2005. (b) Time series of total biomass for
individuals aged 3 years or older (black line), reported yield (grey line), and spawning-stock biomass (SSB, thick black line), as reported by ICES AFWG 2009. (c) Current
HCR (continuous line), as determined by the two parameters Bpa and Fpa (dashed lines).
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A policy-maker may, for instance, take into account that parts of
society are concerned about nature conservation in general, or
about a speciﬁc species or ecosystem in particular. Accordingly,
the policy-maker may decide to harvest less than what would be
optimal if only yields or proﬁts were to be maximized. The
opposite can be true when ﬁshing is considered part of a region’s
cultural heritage, which society ﬁnds worth preserving even at
the expense of reducing proﬁts through subsidies or over-ﬁshing.
It is important to acknowledge that ﬁsheries management—
just as every other part of public policy—is, inherently political.
Nevertheless, objectives that politicians consider important should
be clearly deﬁned; otherwise, hidden objectives can sneak in
through the backdoor and take precedence [18]. It is therefore
desirable to devise models that are ﬂexible enough to evaluate
realistic political options and transparent enough to communicate
their consequences effectively to all stakeholders.
Technically, an HCR is a feedback control that links one or
more control variables (e.g., catch) to one or more state variables
(e.g., SSB) of the stock. If an operational biological model is in
place and is sufﬁciently simple, such a feedback control can be
derived analytically [24–27]. There is, however, a critical trade-off
between analytic tractability and realistic complexity, implying
that sufﬁciently detailed biological models will often be too
complicated for deriving an optimal HCR analytically. In such
cases, it is necessary to sacriﬁce analytical rigor for biological
realism and use numerical analyses instead.
When setting up an HCR, policy-makers can express their
resource-management objectives by emphasizing quantitative
goals, which different scientiﬁc disciplines can then jointly help
to assess. HCRs are readily based on such an approach, and
accordingly offer various advantages for modern ﬁsheries man-
agement, including (i) a reduced need for annual negotiations on
how to set harvest quotas, (ii) the integration of interdisciplinary
research into policy-making, and (iii) the strengthening of a
constructive dialogue between policy-makers, stakeholders, and
the scientiﬁc community. Harvest policies formulated through
HCRs therefore represent an ideal platform for policy makers and
scientists on which to interact. Positive practical experiences with
the HCR framework have been highlighted in recent reviews
[28–30].
1.3. Aims of this study
The approach here is to use a detailed bio-economic model for
the NEA cod ﬁshery to evaluate the current HCR and to inform
policy-makers about how this HCR performs compared to
alternative HCRs that are optimized for different objectives. The
purpose of this study is to provide an overview of the strengths
and weaknesses associated with HCRs devised to meet the
different objectives. In doing so, this study aims to examine
how these alternate HCRs for the management of NEA cod
perform in comparison with the currently implemented HCR.
Kovalev and Bogstad in 2005 [12] addressed the performance
of the current HCR, however, their model is purely biological and
thus does not include economic objectives. While their biological
model operates at the population level, ours is individual-based.
This allows us to incorporate more biological detail and realistic
complexity than other biological models used in previous bio-
economic studies. This level of realism is needed: to evaluate the
merits of any HCR, the used biological model must match the
observational data it represents sufﬁciently well, if inferences for
future ﬁshing pressures are to be trusted. Analogous considera-
tions apply to the used economic model. The bio-economic model
presented below is the most detailed such model developed for
NEA cod, and the ﬁrst applied to evaluating HCRs.
2. Materials and methods
The bio-economic model considered here consists of two sub-
models linked through an annual feedback loop (Fig. 3). The
biological sub-model describes biological details such as pro-
cesses of growth and maturation speciﬁc to NEA cod, while the
economic sub-model describes economic details such as costs and
harvest functions. The biological model delivers information
about the stock’s SSB, which is fed into the considered HCR to
calculate a total allowable catch (TAC), which consequently
determines ﬂeet proﬁts, yield, etc. in the economic model. The
total catch feeds then back into the biological model affecting the
stock dynamics. The two sub-models have been speciﬁcally
estimated and calibrated for the NEA cod ﬁshery using data from
the time period 1978–2007 (Table 1).
2.1. Biological sub-model
The biological sub-model is based on a previously published
model [31], which is parameterized for NEA cod. The biological
model is individual-based, age- and length-structured, and
describes an individual’s life-cycle from birth to death through
annual processes of maturation, growth, reproduction, and mor-
tality [31,32]. This model includes stock-speciﬁc estimated rela-
tionships for maturation tendency, density-dependent growth,
stock–recruitment, and energy allocation. Individuals vary in age,
Maturation
Reproduction
Growth
Mortality
SSB
Biological model Economic model
Catch
Demand
Costs 
Production
TAC
Profit
Surplus
Yield
HCR
Fig. 3. Overview of the bio-economic model, its main components, and the feedback links between the two sub-models. The biological sub-model predicts spawning-stock
biomass (SSB). This enters a harvest control rule (HCR), characterized by a pair of parameter values, that determines the total annual catch (TAC). This feeds into the
economic sub-model, where functions for demand, costs, and production predict annual total proﬁt and total welfare. The total catch then feeds into the biological model,
affecting the development of the stock. Depending on the considered management objective, the parameter pair that maximizes either total welfare, total proﬁt, or total
yield determines the optimal HCR and its resultant catch.
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body size, and maturation status, which are tracked on an annual
basis. Unlike some previous models [31–34], this model reduces
complexity by keeping life-history traits monomorphic and by
not considering their evolutionary dynamics. The included life-
history traits describe an individual’s maturation tendency,
growth, and reproductive investment. All model parameters are
based on empirical data (Table 1).
Each year, the tendency that an immature individual will
mature depends on a probabilistic maturation reaction norm
[35–37], which describes maturation probability pm(a,l) as a
function of age a and body length l. This probability equals 50%
at the length at age lP50(a)¼ iþsa, and is given by
pm a,lð Þ ¼ 1= 1þexp  lðað ÞlP50ðaÞÞ=c
  
ð1Þ
The probabilistic maturation reaction norm thus has intercept
i and slope s. Its width w, spanning from the 25% to the 75%
percentile of maturation probability [31,32], is determined by the
parameter c where c¼w=½logit pu
 
logit pl
 
, and pu and pl are
the probabilities for the upper and lower bounds of the PMRN.
The growth rate of individuals depends on the total biomass of
the population, to account for reductions in growth expected
when population density is high and resource availability conse-
quently is low. Data from 1978–2009 on annual growth incre-
ments gD,t in year t, together with data on total stock biomass Bt of
individuals aged 3 years or older in year t, were used to estimate
the two parameters g and x of an exponential relationship for
density-dependent growth,
gD,t ¼ gexp xBtð Þ, ð2Þ
where g is the maximum growth increment (realized at Bt¼0)
and x determines the strength of density dependence in
growth (Table 1). For immature individuals, denoted by a super-
script I, body length in year t is determined by their length in the
previous year enhanced by the corresponding growth increment,
l
I
t ¼ l
I
t1þgD,t1.
Mature individuals, denoted by a superscript M, allocate a
proportion of their resources to reproduction. In this model,
reproductive investment is measured by the gonado-somatic
index G, deﬁned as the ratio between an individual’s gonadic
and somatic mass. A conversion factor g accounts for the higher
energy content of gonadic tissue relative to somatic tissue [38,39].
Consequently, the length of a mature individual is given by
l
M
t ¼ 3 l
M
t1þgD,t1
 
= 3þgG
 
ð3Þ
An individual’s fecundity f depends on its body length l,
f ¼ kl
j
GD, ð4Þ
where D is the weight-speciﬁc packing density of oocytes [40],
and k and j are allometric constants relating body length to
somatic body mass. Sex is assigned randomly at birth based on a
1:1 primary sex ratio.
The density-dependent newborn mortality is determined by an
estimated Beverton–Holt stock–recruitment relationship for 3-
year-olds [32], depending on SSB and climate. The climatic
variable, the sea-surface temperature from the Kola meridian
transect (331500 E, 701500 N to 721500 N) has been shown to be
an important factor for recruitment [41–44]. This annual climatic
data is used as input to the modelled stock–recruitment relation-
ship (prior to 1990, the mean value from 1980–1989, while from
2004 onwards, the mean value from 1990–2007). Back-calculating
from the predicted number of 3-year-olds, the number of 1-year-
olds is determined by setting instantaneous natural mortality rate
to 0.2 yr1, as conventionally done for that stock [11].
Individuals die from natural mortality or ﬁshing mortality.
Natural mortality is parsimoniously held constant and set equal
to an instantaneous rate of 0.2 yr1, as routinely assumed in the
stock assessment of NEA cod [11]. In terms of ﬁshing mortality,
immature ﬁsh can only get captured on the feeding grounds,
while mature ﬁsh may also experience ﬁshing mortality on the
spawning grounds (Fig. 2a). Fishing mortality rates F from the
Table 1
Parameter values and data sources for the bio-economic model.
Parameter Value Eq. Source
Biological sub-model
Probabilistic maturation reaction norm slope, s 0.0 cm yr1 1 [36]n
Probabilistic maturation reaction norm intercept, i 64.0 cm 1 [36]n
Probabilistic maturation reaction norm width, w 18.9 cm 1 [36]n
Strength of density dependence in growth, x 2.08105 kg1 2 [36]n
Reproductive investment, G 0.17 3 [63]
Reproductive-investment conversion factor, g 0.60241 3 [38,39]
Allometric proportionality constant, k 4.9106 kg cm j 4 [64]
Allometric exponent, j 3.18 4 [64]
Weight-speciﬁc oocyte density, D 4.45106 kg1 4 [40]
Maximum growth increment, g 13.0 cm – [11]
Natural mortality rate 0.2 yr1 – [11]
Spawning-ground ﬁshing mortality before 1990 0.13 yr1 – [3]n
Immature feeding-ground ﬁshing mortality before 1990 0.52 yr1 – [3]n
Size-selectivity midpoint, l50 49.34 cm – [45]
Size-selectivity range, SR 10.47 cm – [45]
Factor for conversion of total ﬁshing mortality to feeding-ground ﬁshing mortality, Z 1.15 – [3]n
Factor for conversion of total ﬁshing mortality to spawning-ground ﬁshing mortality, k 0.215 – [3]n
Economic sub-model
Intercept of demand function, p 18.88 NOK kg1 5 [27]
Slope of demand function, b 1.19257108 NOK kg2 5 [27]
Stock-output elasticity, a 0.58 5 [27]
Effort-output elasticity, b 0.85 5 [27]
Catchability coefﬁcient, q 6.1710–4 tonnes1 day1 5 [27]
Fixed costs per vessel, cf 1.5510
6 NOK 6 [27]
Coefﬁcient of variable costs per vessel, cv 131.6 NOK tonnes
1 day1 6 [27]
Optimal number of tonnage days, e* 66,712 tonnes day 9 [27]
n M. Heino and O.R. Godø (unpublished data).
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stock-assessment model [3] are translated into harvest probabil-
ities 1exp ZF
 
in the feeding grounds and 1exp kFð Þ in the
spawning grounds, where the parameters Z and k convert the
total ﬁshing mortality rate into those in the feeding grounds and
spawning grounds, respectively. Also taken into account is that
only mature ﬁsh migrate out of the Barents Sea for about ¼ of the
year, and therefore reduced their harvest probabilities thereto.
A selectivity curve accounting for the lower catchability of
smaller-sized ﬁsh, estimated for the commercial trawling gear
used in the NEA cod ﬁshery [45] was also implemented. Initially,
ﬁshing mortality is held constant in the model at the 1932–1989
average, in order to allow the population to reach demographic
equilibrium (in terms of stable total biomass, SSB, individual
growth, and age and length at maturation). After that equilibra-
tion, the stock’s observed annual ﬁshing mortality rates for each
year between 1990 and 2003 were implemented, resulting in very
good matches between model-predicted and observed SSB values.
From 2004 onwards, one of the alternative HCRs was introduced,
as described in more detail below.
The individual-based model simulations have only computa-
tional capacity to follow about 50,000 super-individuals [46,47].
We therefore scale up this modelled population by a scaling factor
of 80,000 which can recreate the appropriate stock levels in the
natural population [3]. All model predictions reported below,
such as SSB and catch, are given for this scaled population, and
thus are directly comparable to the observed data.
2.2. Economic sub-model
The main components of the economic sub-model are the
functions describing demand, costs, and production. All analyses
in this section are further explained in Richter et al. [27].
Individual vessel data for 1990–2000 were used to estimate costs
and production for the component of the Norwegian trawler ﬂeet
that caught cod north of 621N. These data, collected by the
Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries (Bergen, Norway), are
described in more detail in Sandberg [48].
The NEA cod ﬁshery contributes a large part of the world’s cod
landings and therefore affects the international market price for
cod. To describe this relationship, a linear demand function is
given by
Pt ¼ pbHt , ð5Þ
where Pt is the price for cod in year t, Ht is the total harvested
biomass in year t (as determined by the TAC), and p and b are
parameters. The production function is estimated as a Cobb–
Douglas function [49,50]; accordingly, the catch of vessel i in year
t is given by
hi,t ¼ qe
b
i,t
Bat , ð6Þ
where q is a catchability coefﬁcient, and ei,t is the ﬁshing effort of
vessel i in year t. In this model, effort is measured in efﬁciency
units and given by the number of days a vessel is ﬁshing cod
north of 621N multiplied by the vessel’s gross tonnage, so that
differences in operational intensity are taken into account [51].
The parameter a is the stock-output elasticity and b is the effort-
output elasticity, describing, respectively, the percentage change
in harvests caused by a percentage change in stock biomass or
ﬁshing effort. The costs Ci,t incurred by vessel i in year t are given
by the inﬂation-corrected sum of cost components multiplied by
the fraction of days the vessel has ﬁshed cod, as opposed to other
species; the result is split into ﬁxed costs cf and variable costs
cvei,t according to
Ci,t ¼ cfþcvei,t ð7Þ
Multiplying the catch hi,t of vessel i with the price of cod Pt
yields the revenue Pthi,t of vessel i. The proﬁt pi,t of vessel i is then
given by offsetting this revenue with the costs Ci,t of vessel i,
pi,t ¼ Pthi,tCi,t ð8Þ
For NEA cod, the effort-output elasticity b is smaller than 1, so
there is a trade-off between allowing more vessels to enter the
ﬁshing grounds (vessels can then harvest less on average, but do
so more efﬁciently) and allowing larger individual catches per
vessel (vessels can then invest their ﬁxed costs more economic-
ally). For each year t, an optimal number nnt of vessels harvesting
an optimal number en of tonnage days for a given TAC and total
stock biomass (for details see [27]) were identiﬁed, where
nnt ¼Htq
1enbBat ð9Þ
This optimal number of vessels could reﬂect a system of
individual transferable quotas that will be allocated in the most
efﬁcient way. The total ﬂeet proﬁt Pt in year t is given byY
t
¼ nnt PthtCtð Þ, ð10Þ
with ht ¼Ht=n
n
t and Ct¼cfþcve
*. From society’s point of view, it is
desirable to consider that consumers and ﬁsh processors beneﬁt
from buying cheap ﬁsh, and hence, policy-makers may take
consumer surplus into account. Consumer surplus in year t is
given by
St ¼
1
2 pPtð ÞHt ð11Þ
Total welfare is given by the sum of total ﬂeet proﬁt and
consumer surplus,
W t ¼
Y
t
þSt ð12Þ
2.3. Harvest control rules
This study analyzes the performance of several HCRs. First, the
HCR that has been implemented in 2004 [6], will be referred to as
the ‘‘current HCR’’. We only consider the core of the HCR that
relates TAC to SSB; in order to facilitate comparisons between
alternative HCRs, we have ignored the additional elements in the
current HCR that aim at reducing annual variability in TACs.
Second, alternative HCRs that result from the optimization of
speciﬁc objectives will be analyzed and referred to as ‘‘optimized
HCRs’’.
The current HCR for NEA cod is determined by two parameters
in the form of reference points, Bpa and Fpa. The optimized HCRs
are also characterized by two parameters: (i) the maximum
ﬁshing mortality Fmax, and (ii) the level Bmax of SSB at which the
maximum ﬁshing mortality Fmax starts to apply. Each of the
optimized HCRs were derived by allowing Fmax and Bmax to vary
across a wide range of values (see below), without constraining
them to existing reference points, and by then choosing those
combinations of Fmax and Bmax that best fulﬁl the speciﬁc
objective aimed to optimize. The current HCR is recovered as a
special case by setting Fmax¼Fpa and Bmax¼Bpa. For all considered
HCRs, the ﬁshing mortality rate resulting for a particular SSB is
determined as follows: if the SSB is between 0 and Bmax, the
instantaneous ﬁshing mortality rate for that year is Fmax SSB/Bmax;
otherwise, the instantaneous ﬁshing mortality rate is Fmax
(Fig. 2c).
The HCR parameters were optimized for three different objec-
tives, maximizing either total welfare, total proﬁt, or total yield.
For all considered combinations of Bmax (varied over the range 0–
800,000 tonnes in steps of 20,000 tonnes) and Fmax (varied over
the range 0.1–1.3 yr1 in steps of 0.01 yr1), the discounted total
welfare, total proﬁt, and total yield over the period 2004–2053
were calculated. This gives a grid of 4961 different HCRs. The
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particular parameter combination that maximizes one of these
three measures is identiﬁed as the corresponding optimal HCR. To
account for demographic stochasticity inherent to individual-
based models, all results shown are averages over 15 independent
simulation runs.
3. Results
3.1. Different objectives lead to different harvest control rules
Here follows a description and comparison of the results for
the optimized HCRs with the current HCR, for a discount rate of 0,
while the effect of different discount rates will be analyzed in
Section 3.3. Not surprisingly, the results show that the optimized
HCRs depend markedly on the speciﬁc objective that is max-
imized (Fig. 4a).
The yield-maximizing HCR allows for much higher ﬁshing
mortality than the current HCR (Fmax¼1.18 yr
1 instead of
0.4 yr1; Table 2), but implies a signiﬁcantly more precautionary
SSB safety margin than the current HCR (Bmax¼740,000 tonnes
instead of 460,000 tonnes; Table 2). The HCR that maximizes
total welfare implies a higher maximum ﬁshing mortality than
the current HCR (Fmax¼0.54 yr
1 instead of 0.4 yr1; Table 2)
and also results in a more precautionary SSB buffer than the
current HCR (Bmax¼640,000 tonnes instead of 460,000 tonnes;
Table 2). Strikingly, the proﬁt-maximizing HCR is almost iden-
tical to the current HCR, even though the latter is slightly more
precautionary in terms of maximum ﬁshing mortality
(Fmax¼0.4 yr
1 instead of 0.43 yr1; Table 2).
3.2. Emerging properties of stock and fishery
This section examines how the optimized HCRs would have
performed had they been implemented in 2004 (Fig. 4 and
Table 2), again for a discount rate of 0%. The HCR that maximizes
total yield gives the highest average TAC over time, even though
the HCR that maximizes total welfare allows for almost the same
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Fig. 4. Optimal harvest control rules (HCRs) for different management objectives, maximizing either total welfare (dashed black line), total proﬁt (grey line), or total yield
(thin black line). The current HCR is shown for comparison (thick black line). (a) Each HCR maps a certain ﬁshing mortality for a given level of SSB. The resultant emerging
harvesting properties are shown as (b) annual total allowable catch (TAC), (c) spawning-stock biomass (SSB), and (d) total proﬁt. The shaded area indicates SSB levels
below the precautionary reference point Bpa determined by ICES.
Table 2
Optimal harvest control rules (HCRs) for three alternative management objectives, maximizing either total welfare, total proﬁt, or total yield, for a discount rate of 0%.
Emerging harvesting properties for 2004–2053 are given as temporal means (with coefﬁcients of temporal variation in parentheses) for catch ratio, total allowable catch
(TAC), spawning-stock biomass (SSB), total proﬁt, and total welfare. The catch ratio is the emerging ratio between TAC and total biomass of individuals aged 3 years
or older.
Objective Fmax (yr
1) Bmax (1000 tonnes) Catch ratio TAC (1000 tonnes) SSB (1000 tonnes) Total proﬁt
(million NOK)
Total welfare
(million NOK)
Maximize total welfare 0.54 640 0.248 (0.039) 431 (0.064) 571 (0.058) 3410 (0.049) 4520 (0.065)
Maximize total profit 0.43 460 0.214 (0.027) 408 (0.062) 709 (0.09) 3466 (0.053) 4465 (0.067)
Maximize yield 1.18 740 0.301 (0.038) 445 (0.057) 383 (0.029) 3190 (0.043) 4374 (0.058)
Current HCR 0.4 460 0.200 (0.025) 399 (0.066) 756 (0.095) 3468 (0.057) 4424 (0.071)
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catch (Fig.4b). The HCR that maximizes total proﬁt and the
current HCR both give lower TACs than the HCR optimized for
total welfare.
The HCR that maximizes total yield results in a level of SSB that
is constantly below the level ICES considers as precautionary
(Fig. 4c). This indicates that maximum sustainable yield (MSY) as
a sole management target may not necessarily result in sufﬁciently
precautionary harvesting. The HCR that maximizes total welfare
results in SSB levels that stay above the precautionary reference
point most of the time. The HCR that maximizes total proﬁt and the
current HCR both produce SSB levels between 700,000 and
800,000 tonnes, which can be considered very precautionary.
Perhaps most surprisingly, the current HCR produces total
proﬁts that are almost identical to those resulting from the HCR
that maximizes total proﬁts (Fig. 4d). The HCR that maximizes
total welfare delivers slightly lower total proﬁts, while the HCR
that maximizes total yield produces even lower total proﬁts.
The HCR that maximizes total yield has the highest catch ratio
(TAC divided by total biomass of individuals aged 3 years or older)
and must therefore be recognized as the most aggressive harvest
strategy, exploiting the largest portion of the stock; the lowest catch
ratio is observed for the current HCR, with HCRs maximizing total
welfare and total proﬁt lying in between. The coefﬁcient of variation
in the TAC is almost identical for all considered HCRs (Table 2).
3.3. Discounting
Society may prefer short-term beneﬁts over longer-term
beneﬁts, and this study therefore derives optimal HCRs also for
discount rates of 2% and 4% (Table 3). Perhaps surprisingly, the
HCR that maximizes total proﬁt is identical for all discount rates.
At the resolution considered for Fmax and Bmax, the HCRs that
maximize total welfare are indistinguishable for discount rates of
0% and 2%. For a discount rate of 4%, a slightly higher Fmax and a
smaller Bmax are optimal, implying a more aggressive harvesting
pattern resulting in lower SSB and higher TAC. While only results
are shown for discount rates of up to 4%, even higher discounting
does not affect the results qualitatively; see also [27]. Two
mechanisms are important for explaining the relative unimpor-
tance of discounting. First, more aggressive harvesting today leads
to lower recruitment in the future. Even when discounting the
future, those beneﬁts from harvesting today do not offset the
relative losses that occur in the future. Second, increasing har-
vests will result in lower sales prices. At a certain point, the proﬁt
loss resulting from lower prices outweighs the proﬁt gain result-
ing from catching more ﬁsh.
For maximizing yield, the impact of discount rates on the HCR
parameters Fmax and Bmax is not monotonic: Fmax ﬁrst decreases
for higher discount rates, and so does Bmax. For a discount rate of
4%, both Fmax and Bmax increase again. Overall, the catch ratio
increases, meaning that discounting makes the emerging harvest-
ing pattern more aggressive. Average SSB decreases, even though
this does not lead to a higher average TAC.
4. Discussion
The most striking result from the analysis of this bio-economic
model is that the currently implemented HCR for NEA cod is
almost identical with the one that maximizes proﬁts. The current
HCR confers not only near-maximal proﬁts, but also the highest,
and hence safest, SSB levels. This is an unusually encouraging
ﬁnding, given that on a global scale management failures appear
to be more common than management successes [52,53]. The
results conﬁrm that achieving economic objectives does not
necessarily come at the expense of sacriﬁcing biological sustain-
ability [19]. The common key to reach high proﬁts and high SSB
levels is a low ﬁshing mortality. This study ﬁnds that when a high
catch has a negative effect on the price, low harvesting rates are
favoured even more. Indeed, in many circumstances ‘‘a monopo-
list is the conservationist’s friend’’ [54]. It is an inherently political
question whether maximizing proﬁts is a desirable management
target: higher prices are then paid by all ﬁsh consumers, while a
small number of ﬁshers beneﬁt [55].
Having established that low ﬁshing mortality is economically
optimal, one can, in principle, ensure such low ﬁshing mortality
by setting a low reference point for Fmax or a high precautionary
buffer Bmax. With the former setting, one tries to avoid breaking
safe biological limits in the ﬁrst place. With the latter setting, one
tries to ensure that biomass levels will recover once low SSB
levels are reached. The 10 best HCRs for each of the different
management objectives are overall very similar; yet, there are
some HCRs that stand out (Fig. 5). This is due to the trade-off
between Fmax and Bmax, which is clearly exempliﬁed for the
objective of maximizing yield: if Fmax increases, then the optimal
Bmax also increases. For the HCRs that maximize proﬁt and
welfare, especially in one case (Fig. 5a, b), the Bmax is lower,
while the Fmax is more or less unchanged (Fig. 5). However, the
resultant catch ratio and cash-ﬂow are very similar. This is
Table 3
Optimal harvest control rules (HCRs) for three alternative management objectives, maximizing either total welfare, total proﬁt, or total yield, for different discount rates
(0%, 2%, and 4%). Emerging harvesting properties for 2004–2053 are given as temporal means (with coefﬁcients of temporal variation in parentheses) for catch ratio, total
allowable catch (TAC), spawning-stock biomass (SSB), total proﬁt, and total welfare. The catch ratio is the emerging ratio between TAC and total biomass of individuals
aged 3 years or older.
Objective Fmax (yr
1) Bmax (1000 tonnes) Catch ratio TAC (1000 tonnes) SSB (1000 tonnes) Total proﬁt (million NOK) Total welfare (million NOK)
Maximize total welfare
0% discount ratea 0.54 640 0.248 (0.039) 431 (0.064) 571 (0.058) 3410 (0.049) 4520 (0.065)
2% discount ratea 0.54 640 0.248 (0.039) 431 (0.064) 571 (0.058) 3410 (0.049) 4520 (0.065)
4% discount rate 0.58 160 0.260 (0.026) 436 (0.051) 526 (0.057) 3375 (0.042) 4512 (0.055)
Maximize total profit
0% discount ratea 0.43 460 0.214 (0.027) 408 (0.062) 709 (0.09) 3466 (0.053) 4465 (0.067)
2% discount ratea 0.43 460 0.214 (0.027) 408 (0.062) 709 (0.09) 3466 (0.053) 4465 (0.067)
4% discount ratea 0.43 460 0.214 (0.027) 408 (0.062) 709 (0.09) 3466 (0.053) 4465 (0.067)
Maximize yield
0% discount rate 1.18 740 0.301 (0.038) 445 (0.057) 383 (0.029) 3190 (0.043) 4374 (0.058)
2% discount rate 0.79 200 0.307 (0.028) 445 (0.047) 367 (0.044) 3164 (0.04) 4347 (0.051)
4% discount rate 0.84 360 0.316 (0.03) 444 (0.049) 340 (0.052) 3110 (0.04) 4288 (0.053)
a The same optimal HCR is obtained for different discount rates.
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because these HCRs avoid the low SSB levels at which Bmax
affects TACs.
An important additional advantage of a low ﬁshing mortality,
given by a low Fmax, is that it produces a more stable harvest
pattern, which is usually preferred over a more volatile one (the
current HCR for NEA cod includes an explicit clause to promote
stable catches [3]). An advantage of a strict precautionary buffer,
given by a high Bmax, is that it accounts for factors other than
ﬁshing mortality that might reduce SSB. If such cases occur, it will
usually still be important to reduce harvest pressure, even if
ﬁshing has not been causing the stock decline. The harvest
pattern that arises from the current HCR gives an SSB that
consistently lies above the precautionary biomass limit Bpa
(Fig. 4). However, this does not imply that precautionary buffers
are not needed, because uncertainty is always present and risks
can never be fully controlled [56]. The good news is that these
results suggest that adopting these precautionary buffers will
most likely not come at the expense of proﬁts. These buffers are
comparable to a ﬁre insurance, which most home owners
consider to be a worthwhile investment, yet hope that they
are never actually needed.
Maximizing yield can lead to a harvesting pattern that is not
consistent with what ICES considers to be precautionary, with SSB
levels falling below the precautionary reference point Bpa (Fig. 4c).
There is a consensus among economists and biologists that
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is not a perfect management
target [49,50,57–59]. This suggests that if managers decide to
target MSY, it will be crucial to deﬁne a strict limit reference point
Bpa that ensures safe SSB levels [60].
A disadvantage with the model presented here is the compu-
tational cost required for evaluating HCRs. Also, these results are
only numerical approximations of optimal HCRs, and thus do not
offer the precision of analytical solutions. Although the model
simulations already search over an extensive and ﬁne-grained
grid of HCR parameter values, the grid’s resolution could be
enhanced, or a ﬁnal step of gradual local optimization could be
added. However, the emerging harvest patterns implied by the
best models (Fig. 5) exhibit relatively small differences, which
suggests that not much could be gained by further numerical
precision. Therefore, this approach offers a decent compromise
between complexity and tractability. In fact, in designing this
model, great emphasis is placed on integrating sufﬁcient process-
based biological and economic detail. Owing to its resulting
ﬂexibility, this bio-economic model could easily be employed to
address related additional questions, such as predicting the
effects of climate change, ﬁsheries-induced evolution, or oil spills
on the performance of the current HCR and its alternatives.
The developed model includes several simplifying assump-
tions. An empirically derived size–selectivity curve has only been
estimated for the Norwegian trawlers in the cod ﬁshery [45], and
it would be interesting to account separately for the size–
selectivity curve of the Russian trawlers, which however appears
to be unavailable at present. Also, temperature only varies in our
model from 1990–2004, contributing to the initial stock ﬂuctua-
tions, and this model do not further speciﬁcally account for the
role climatic changes. Furthermore, if there is a non-negligible
probability that a stock will collapse, this ought to be reﬂected in
the evaluation of the corresponding management decisions. In
particular, if one optimizes proﬁts while insufﬁciently accounting
for risk, it is likely that precautionary buffers will be too
permissive for coping with actual risk, and one will typically
end up with a stock poised ‘‘at the edge of the cliff’’ [61]. The
acceptable level of risk, as well as the chosen discount rate,
remain key political choices. The purpose and promise of detailed,
quantitative, process-based bio-economic models, such as the one
presented here, is to strengthen the rational and transparent
translation of these political choices into policies such as HCRs.
5. Conclusions
This bio-economic model predicts that the current HCR rule is
practically identical with the economically optimal one, suggest-
ing that economic and biological sustainability can go hand in
hand. A relatively low ﬁshing mortality is a major factor in
achieving both. Also, yield maximization alone has been demon-
strated to potentially result in a lack of precaution.
The design of HCRs provides a platform for promoting and
structuring the dialogue between policy-makers, managers, scien-
tists, and stakeholders. With this in mind, HCRs can be tailored
according to a variety of management objectives. The beneﬁts of
translating a harvest policy into an HCR are epitomized by the
phrase ‘‘quantiﬁcation leads to clariﬁcation’’ [62]: unclear objec-
tives and ‘‘gut-feeling’’ policies do not lend themselves to being
quantiﬁed as part of harvest-strategy evaluation. Nonetheless, it
is important to realize that quantiﬁcation alone might increase
the precision, but not necessarily the accuracy, of results. There-
fore, intensive and open dialogue between managers, who set
operational ﬁsheries objectives, and scientists, who aid in
designing and testing management strategies, will remain
essential in pursuing the sustainable management of aquatic
resources.
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